Abstract. Knudsen and Preneel (Asiacrypt'96 and Crypto'97) introduced a hash function design in which a linear error-correcting code is used to build a wide-pipe compression function from underlying blockciphers operating in Davies-Meyer mode. Their main design goal was to deliver compression functions with collision resistance up to, and even beyond, the block size of the underlying blockciphers. In this paper, we present new collision-finding attacks against these compression functions using the ideas of an unpublished work of Watanabe and the preimage attack ofÖzen, Shrimpton, and Stam (FSE'10). In brief, our best attack has a time complexity strictly smaller than the block-size for all but two of the parameter sets. Consequently, the time complexity lower bound proven by Knudsen and Preneel is incorrect and the compression functions do not achieve the security level they were designed for.
Introduction
Hash functions are currently at the centre of the cryptographic community's attention. While most of this attention is geared directly towards the SHA-3 competition (by analysing its remaining candidates), other, arguably more fundamental questions regarding hash function design should not be forgotten. After all, the study of the underlying principles of hash function design are potentially beneficial for the SHA-3 decision process.
The two most revered principles in hash function design are (i) the MerkleDamgård iterative construction, or more generally the principle of designing a secure compression function and (ii) the Davies-Meyer construction, or more generally the principle of using a blockcipher as underlying primitive. Indeed, the currently standardized hash functions from the SHA family follow this approach (as did their predecessor MD5) as well as several of the SHA-3 candidates.
It was already recognized early on that the output sizes of traditional blockciphers are insufficient to yield a secure compression function [16] . This still holds true today: for all the (optimally secure) PGV blockcipher-based compression functions [10, 1, 12] based on an -bit blockcipher, the (time) complexity of collision-and preimage-finding attacks is at most 2 /2 , resp. 2 ; when = 128 (e.g. AES) the resulting bounds are mostly unacceptable for current practice (in particular for collision resistance).
To achieve acceptable security (based on small block sizes) it is necessary to output a multiple of the block-length. In the 1990s many constructions were proposed for this goal, mostly outputting 2 bits with the explicit collision resistance target of 2 (see [3, 9] for an overview). The standard goal for these constructions has been optimal collision-resistance: a target output size is fixed and the compression function should be collision resistant up to the birthday bound for that digest size. In three papers [4, 5, 6 ], Knudsen and Preneel adopted a different approach, namely to fix a particular security target and let the output size (and relatedly the number of blockcipher calls) vary as needed in order to guarantee a particular security target without imposing optimal security.
Specifically, given independent ideal compression functions 1 , . . . , , each mapping bits to bits, they create a new 'bigger' compression function outputting bits. Following principles (i) and (ii) already mentioned, they then propose to instantiate the underlying ideal compression functions with a blockcipher run in Davies-Meyer mode and to iterate the compression function to obtain a full blockcipher-based hash function. However, they derive their security from the compression function, so that is where we will focus our attention.
The 1 , . . . , are run in parallel where each of their inputs is some linear combination of the blocks of message and chaining variable that are to be processed; the -bit output of their construction is the concatenation of the outputs of these parallel calls. The elegance of the KP construction is in how the inputs to 1 , . . . , are computed. They use the generator matrix of an [ , , ] error-correcting code over F 2 to determine how the input blocks of the 'big' compression function are xor'ed together to form the inputs to the underlying functions. (In a generalization they consider the as mapping from ′ to ′ bits instead and use a code over F 2 .)
The (deliberate) effect of this design is that when two inputs to the 'big' compression function differ, the corresponding inputs for the underlying functions will differ for at least functions. In particular, when using a systematic generator, a change in the systematic part of the input results in at least − 1 so-called active functions in the non-systematic part. Intuitively this means that one has to find a preimage, resp. a collision for the − 1 active functions in parallel. Based on this observation, Knudsen and Preneel claim that (under an assumption) any collision attack needs time at least 2 ( −1) /2 (and as many evaluations) and they conjecture that a preimage attack will require time at least 2 ( −1) . Additionally, they give preimage and collision attacks (sometimes matching their lower bounds). Watanabe [14] already pointed out a collision attack beating the one given by Knudsen and Preneel for many of the parameter sets. In particular, his differential attack works whenever < 2 and has a query and time complexity of essentially 2 . Thus he demonstrated that the proven collision resistance lower bound given by Knudsen and Preneel is incorrect whenever < 2 and > 3. For a code with minimum distance = 3 he matches the Knudsen-Preneel 2 collision-resistance lower bound, but does not violate it; the two codes proposed by Knudsen [7] demonstrated a remarkably efficient preimage attack that, for 9 out of 16 cases, runs in time 2
/ which was shown optimal. Moreover, using a yield-based argument, they showed that an information-theoretic adversary in principle should be able to find collisions after only 2 /(2 ) queries.
Our contribution. In this paper we deal what we believe will be the final blow against the Knudsen-Preneel compression functions. Our contribution is fourfold, with a summary provided in Table 1 . For completeness, we have also inves-tigated the time complexity that one would obtain by straightforward adaptation of the ideas and query complexities ofÖSS; we refer to the full version of this paper [8] for the details.
The mise en place in Section 4 provides a detailed mathematical characterization of the Knudsen-Preneel compression function's preprocessing. As a first simple result, this allows us in Section 5.1 to revise the attack of Watanabe in a way that slightly reduces the time requirements, yet significantly increases the number of collisions it can produce. More precisely, after an initial effort of 2 , we can generate (up to) 2 ( − ) collisions in constant time (for > ). In our revised version of Watanabe's attack, we fix a pure tensor to create a differential. By adaptively looking for an arbitrary tensor and using the same type of queries asÖzen, Shrimpton, and Stam we arrive in Section 5.2 at a new, symbiotic collision-finding attack with time complexity 2 /( +1) . The attack works whenever ≤ (as in Watanabe's case). Even more amazing is that if the inequality is strict, that is if < , the adversary can create further collisions (like our revised attack) in constant time (up to 2 ( − ) collisions). Thirdly, in Section 6.1 we introduce a parametrized information-theoretic collision attack. It turns out that the new symbiotic attack and the oldÖSS information-theoretic collision attack are both on opposite ends of the spectrum of this parametrized attack, yet optimality is typically achieved somewhere in the middle-with KP([4, 2, 3] 8 ) and KP([5, 2, 4] 8 ) again as exceptions-yielding query complexity 2 /(3 − ) . Our final contribution is a reduced-time variant of our optimized attack above. For this we use the same ideas asÖSS, but with a crucial twist: where they used the dual code to look for preimages efficiently, we will use the dual shortened code to search for collisions efficiently. As a result, for 12 out of 16 suggested parameters we can mount a collision attack whose time complexity matches its query complexity (ignoring constants and logarithmic factors). Even better, only for KP([5, 2, 4] 8 ) we are unable to beat the time-complexity of any prior attack we are aware of, for the rest we set new records.
Preliminaries
With some minor modifications, we will adhere to the notation also used bÿ Ozen, Shrimpton, and Stam.
Linear error correcting codes. An [ , , ] 2 linear error correcting code is the set of elements (codewords) in a -dimensional subspace of F 2 (for ≥ ), where the minimum distance is defined as the minimum Hamming weight (taken over all nonzero codewords in ). The dual code [ , − , ⊥ ] 2 is the set of all elements in the − -dimensional subspace orthogonal to (with respect to the usual inner product), and its minimum distance is denoted ⊥ . The Singleton bound puts a limit on the minimum distance: ≤ − + 1. Codes matching the Singleton bound are called maximum distance separable (MDS). An important property of an MDS code is that its duals is MDS as well, so ⊥ = + 1. as the restriction of to those columns indexed by ℐ. For a code and any index set ℐ ⊆ {1, . . . , }, we want to defineĨ ⊂ {1, . . . , } such that Ĩ is invertible (thus in particular |Ĩ| = ) andĨ ⊆ ℐ or ℐ ⊆Ĩ. For MDS codes, the existence of such anĨ can be shown easily (and we can impose uniqueness e.g. by virtue of an ordering). For non-MDS codes there exist some ℐ for which such anĨ does not exist (for example the ℐ ⊂ {1, . . . , } for which |ℐ| = but ℐ is not invertible), however for any target cardinality it is possible to find an ℐ (of that cardinality) that does have anĨ (e.g. by first going through the systematic columns); we call such an ℐ admissible. ( ) for the resulting value. Of primary interest for us will be single-layer PuRF-based compression functions without feedforward. These call all oracles in parallel and compute the output based only on the results of these calls; in particular, input to the compression function is not considered.
Most PuRF-based (and blockcipher-based) compression functions are of a special type. Instead of arbitrary pre-and postprocessing, one finds only functions that are blockwise linear. The Knudsen-Preneel construction is also blockwise linear, so let us recall from [7] what is a blockwise-linear scheme.
Definition 1 (Blockwise-linear scheme). Let , , , , be positive integers and let matrices C
be given. We define = BL (C pre , C post ) to be a family of single-layer PuRF-based compression functions : {0, 1} → {0, 1} , for all positive integers with | . Specifically, let ′ = , and 1 , . . . , ∈ Func( , ). Then on input ∈ {0, 1} (interpreted as column vector),
( ) computes the digest ∈ {0, 1} as follows:
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product and ′ the identity matrix in
In the definition above we silently identified {0, 1} with the vector space F 2 .
The map corresponding to (C pre ⊗ ′ ) will occasionally be denoted pre and its image ℑ( pre ) ⊆ {0, 1} . It will be convenient for us to write the codomain of pre as a direct sum, so we identify {0, 1}
with ⊕ =1 where = F 2 for = 1, . . . , . If 1 ∈ 1 and 2 ∈ 2 , then consequently 1 + 2 will be in 1 ⊕ 2 .
(This extends naturally to
Knudsen-Preneel compression functions. Knudsen and Preneel [4, 5] introduced a family of hash functions employing error correcting codes. (We use the journal version [6] as our frame of reference). Although their work was ostensibly targeted at blockcipher-based designs, the main technical thread of their work develops a transform that extends the range of an 'ideal' compression function (blockcipher-based, or not) in a manner that delivers some target level of security. As is nowadays typical, we understand an ideal compression function to be a PuRF. In fact, the KP transform is a special instance of a blockwise-linear scheme (Definition 1), in which the inputs to the PuRFs are determined by a linear code over a binary field with extension degree > 1, i.e. F 2 , and with C post being the identity matrix over F × 2 (corresponding to concatenating the PuRF outputs). The extension field itself is represented as a subring of the matrix ring (of dimension equalling the extension degree) over the base field.
We formalize this by an injective ring homomorphism :
be the component-wise application of and subsequent identification of (F (we will use¯ for matrices over F 2 of arbitrary dimensions). For completeness, there is also a group homomorphism : F 2 → F 2 such that for all , ℎ ∈ F 2 it holds that ( ℎ) = ( ) ⋅ (ℎ).
be an injective ring homomorphism and let be a positive divisor of such that
→ {0, 1} with = / is defined for all for which divides . Moreover, is based on PuRFs in Func( , ).
For use of in an iterated hash function, note that per invocation (of ) one can compress ( − ) message blocks (hence the requirement > ensures actually compression is taking place), and the rate of the compression function is / −1. We will concentrate on the case ( , ) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 4), (1, 3)} and then in particular on the 16 parameter sets given by Knudsen and Preneel.
1 Since is uniquely determined given (and ), we will often omit it.
Security notions. A collision-finding adversary is an algorithm whose goal is to find two distinct inputs , ′ that hash to the same value, so ( ) = ( ′ ). We will consider adversaries in two scenarios: the information-theoretic one and a more realistic concrete setting. For information-theoretic adversaries the only resource of interest is the number of queries made to their oracles. Otherwise, these adversaries are considered (computationally) unbounded. In the concrete setting, on the other hand, we are interested in the actual runtime of the algorithm and, to a lesser extent, its memory consumption (and code-size). Table 1 ). Both attacks revolve around finding multi-preimages for the systematic part of the construction in sufficient numbers to make it likely that completion to the non-systematic part will yield a full preimage respectively a full collision.
Prior Art on the Knudsen-Preneel Hash Functions
Watanabe's collision-finding attack. Knudsen and Preneel left a considerable gap between the actual complexity of attacks and their lower bounds in the case of collision resistance. Watanabe [14] has pointed out a collision attack that runs in time 2 (and as many PuRF evaluations). Thus, for many of the parameter sets, it beats the one given by Knudsen and Preneel. More interestingly, his attack serves as proof that the lower bound given by Knudsen and Preneel is incorrect for a large class of parameters: whenever < 2 and > 3, which involves 6 out of 16 parameter sets. (See also Table 1 .)
Assume that the code's generator matrix is systematic, that is = ( | ) with
. Then the goal is to generate, for each ∈ {1, . . . , }, a colliding pair of inputs ∕ = ′ (and ( ) = ( ′ )) in such a way that their completion to full 'codewords' satisfies = ′ for ∈ { + 1, . . . , }. This is done by ensuring that
∖{0} is in the 1 We note that our analysis is also valid for = 5 (mimicking the MD4/5 situation).
kernel of¯ ( ) ⊗ ′ (since − < the kernel is guaranteed to contain a nontrivial element). Mutual independence of the inputs to the PuRFs corresponding to the code's systematic part allow the initial collision searches to be mounted independently. Unfortunately, since the collisions need to be rather special (due to fixed 's), the birthday paradox does not apply and a collision search costs about 2 queries and time (per PuRF). On the plus side, the attack is trivially memoryless and parallellizable.
Ozen-Shrimpton-Stam preimage-finding attack. An extensive security analysis for the preimage resistance of KP-constructions, falsifying the designers' conjectured lower bound, has been provided byÖzen, Shrimpton, and Stam [7] . Additionally, they also provided a related collision-finding attack with a surprisingly low query complexity: 2 /(2 ) (but no analysis of its time complexity). At the core of theÖzen-Shrimpton-Stam attacks is the simple observation that (0 || 1 ) ⊕ (0 || 2 ) yields a string of the form (0 || ). More generally, any linear combination of strings with the same pattern of fixed zero bits will yield a string with the same form. By restricting PuRF queries to strings with the same (blockwise) pattern one can optimize the yield of these queries (i.e. the maximum number of KP compression function evaluations an adversary can compute for a given number of queries). Matching the yield with the size of the codomain (resp. its square root) gives rise to an information-theoric preimage (resp. collision) attack.
A second observation is that, in the case of a preimage attack, the dual code can be used to find the preimage far more efficiently than a naive method. Direct application of this method however is disappointing (see Table 1 ). The resulting time complexities are typically much higher than the corresponding query complexities and the attack is seldom competitive with that of Knudsen and Preneel, let alone with that of Watanabe.
Decoding the Knudsen-Preneel Preprocessing
An important property that is exploited by both Watanabe andÖSS is linearity of pre . Indeed, the image ℑ( pre ) itself can be regarded as an
where the minimum distance ′ is largely irrelevant; it satisfies ≤ ′ ≤ ). This has the consequence that if = pre ( ) and ′ = pre ( ′ ) collide, it is guaranteed that = ⊕ ′ ∈ ℑ( pre ), i.e. the difference itself is a (nonzero) codeword in ⊗ . Below we will give a more detailed mathematical characterization of ℑ( pre ), with a special eye towards the improved collision-finding algorithms we will give later on. Most of the results below are mathematically rather straightforward (and the proofs are left to the full version); the machinery is mainly needed to ensure that, when using canonical bases for the various vector spaces, everything lines up correctly and consistently with the actual Knudsen-Preneel compression function.
Recall that we are given an injective ring homomorphism : F 2 → F × 2 and a group isomorphism : F 2 → F 2 that satisfy ( ) (ℎ) = ( ℎ) for all 
=1
to {0, 1} ′ .
To define the group isomorphism we exploit that, luckily, the underlying F 2 arithmetic is essentially preserved by
be the group isomorphism such that ( ) = ( ( )⊗ ′ )⋅ ( ) for all ∈ F ′ 2 and ∈ F 2 . As usual, we will extend to e.g. -tuples of elements in F . This suffices for a group isomorphism from ⊕ ′
to {0, 1} ′ as well.
).
The following proposition develops the key idea on how to recognize that a given
is an element of ℑ( pre ). This result is exploited in [7] to efficiently find preimages for Knudsen-Preneel compression functions.
and a nonzero ∈ F ′ 2 be given. Suppose that =¯ (ℎ ) for some ℎ ∈ ⊥ , then ∈ ℑ( pre ) iff for all positive integers ′ it holds that ( ⊗ ′ ) ⋅ = 0. 
The following lemma states that invertibility of Ĩ suffices to invert pre .
Algorithm 1 (Revised Watanabe Collision Attack).
Input: 
is the unique element for which ′ = pre ( ) satisfies ′ = for ∈Ĩ.
A New Symbiotic Collision-Finding Attack

Revising Watanabe's Attack
Watanabe's attack has complexity 2 , requires > − and essentially finds a single collision. Below we give a revised and improved version of his algorithm. It only has complexity 2 , requires ≥ and it potentially results in many, many collisions. More precisely, if > then after the initial effort (of 2 ) we can find a new collision in constant time, for up to a whopping 2 ( − ) collisions. In his note, Watanabe describes his attack as a differential attack. Where originally was computed as some non-trivial kernel element, we will compute it based on a codeword ∈ of sufficiently low weight and an arbitrary (nonzero) 'block multiplier' . In particular, we will set =¯ ( ⊗ ). By using a minimal weight codeword the attack performs best.
For the revised attack to work, we need one further ingredient. Watanabe assumes a systematic code and exploits that, when < − , there exists a nonzero codeword ∈ for which ( ) ⊆ {1, . . . , }. This allows easy completion of a partial collision to a full collision. Our revised version allows an arbitrary (nonzero) codeword of weight at most (existence of which requires ≤ ). Thus ( ) might no longer map to the systematic part of the code. Luckily, Lemma 3 provides completion to a full collision, provided ℐ = ( ) is admissible. For MDS codes all codewords are admissible; for the four non-MDS codes proposed by Knudsen and Preneel it can be verified that the minimum distance codewords are admissible.
Theorem 1 (Revised Watanabe attack). Let
= KP ([ , , ] 2 ) be given with ≤ . Consider (with | ). Then Algorithm 1 using a minimum-weight codeword (and an arbitrary nonzero ) finds collisions for in expected time 2 (using as many PuRF evaluations).
A New Symbiotic Attack
Our revised version of Watanabe's attack clearly shows that an attacker potentially has a lot of freedom. Below we transform some of this freedom into a faster attack. More to the point, as in the revised Watanabe attack we still look for a collision with differential =¯ ( ⊗ ) and fix the codeword ∈ , but we do not fix the multiplier up front. Instead we determine it based on the outcomes of the queries we make. To increase our success probability, we restrict to the same kind of queries asÖzen, Shrimpton, and Stam did. time (using as many PuRF evaluations) and memory (expressed in -bit blocks).
Proof (Sketch). We will leave showing the correctness of Algorithm 2 to the full version of this paper [8] and only prove here that a collision is expected and that the query and time complexities are as claimed. Since | | = 2 by construction, the attack has the stated query complexity (per PuRF) for = /( + 1) since all queries are made during the Query Phase. Using a naive approach, Local Collision Detection step can be performed in roughly 2 /( +1) comparisons resulting in partial collision lists of expected cardinality | | ≈ 2 (2 −1) for ∈ ℐ. For Global Collision Detection, we just enumerate one partial collision list and check for membership against the others. Assuming constant time memory access, the time complexity of this step is at most ( − 1) max ∈ℐ | |. Since < 1 it follows that 2 − 1 < making the Query Phase dominant with its time complexity of 2 .
Since we have active PuRFs in total, the probability of finding a common element among such lists is then (
To ensure an expected number of collisions of one, we need the second exponent to be at least zero, and indeed, solving for zero gives the desired = /( + 1). ⊓ ⊔ Algorithm 2 (New Symbiotic Collision Attack).
Input:
and a block size = ′ .
Output: A colliding pair ( ,
2 to be determined.
1. Initialization. Set = /( + 1), ℐ = ( ) and determineĨ. Let = ( 1, . . . , ) with ∈ F2 for = 1, . . . , .
2. Query Phase. Define
and, for ∈ ℐ let = ⊂ . Query ∀ ∈ and store the results.
3. Local Collision Detection. For ∈ ℐ create a list of all tuples ( 
6 A Parametrized Collision-Finding Attack
Optimizing the Query Complexity
The symbiotic attack and the information-theoretic attack byÖzen, Shrimpton, and Stam have completely different query complexities and which one is the best seems very parameter dependent. However, it turns out that both attacks are the extreme cases of a more general parametrized attack, as given by Algorithm 3.
2 ) be given. Consider (with | ). Then collisions for can be found with Alg. 3 using 2 queries (per PuRF) where
Proof. That the attack has the stated query complexity follows readily from the usual observation that | | = 2 combined with the computation of exactly matching the theorem statement. What remains to show is that collisions are indeed output and expected with good probability.
For correctness, let ( , ′ ) be output by the algorithm and consider = pre ( ) and ′ = pre ( ′ ). First, notice that Lemma 3 implies that projecting Output: A colliding pair ( ,
and if = pre ( ) and ′ = pre ( ′ ) then for all ∈ ℐ0 it holds that = ′ .
1. Initialization. Set ℐ ← {1, . . . , }∖ℐ0, determineĨ, and set
2. Query Phase. As in Algorithm 2.
5. Collision Pruning. Create ℐ consisting precisely of those elements of ℐ whose first vector (when mapped to the full space) is in ℑ( pre ); If the eventual collision consists of ( , ′ ), then = ⊕ ′ is a codeword as well and the above implies that = 0 for ∈ ℐ 0 . Hence, Lemma 1 applies and˜ = ∑ ∈ℐ is somehow 'spanned' by the shortened code. The restriction ≤ − ensures nontriviality of the shortened code (shortening any further and the shortened code would consist of the zero codeword only resulting in = ′ , so no collision). In case of MDS codes, the shortened code has parameters [ − , − , ′ ] 2 , in particular it has dimension − . (For non-MDS codes it is possible that a higher dimension is achieved.)
As a result, a fraction 2
of the differentials will be satisfactory, leading to an expected number of | ℐ | ≈ 2 ((2 −1)( − )− ( − )) . If ℐ ⊆Ĩ or equivalently − ≤ we are done whenever | ℐ | ≥ 1. Since − ≤ can be rewritten to ≥ − we are in the second case, with = ( − )/( + − 2 ). Writing = (lg | ℐ |)/ and substitution lead to
If on the other handĨ ⊂ ℐ, further filtering is needed. In particular, given a potential 'half' of a collision we need to check if it can correspond to a codeword. SinceĨ ⊂ ℐ, we can uniquely complete to a codeword given of its elements (all within ℐ). The remaining |ℐ| − coordinates need to be in sync. Per remaining element, this occurs with probability 2 (assuming ≤ ). For MDS codes this simplifies to = /( + 1), this time duly coinciding with our symbiotic attack. For non-MDS codes there seems to be a slight mismatch. The reason is that if a non-MDS code is maximally shortened (by = − ), the shortened code has dimension 1, whereas in the derivation of Theorem 3 we pessimistically assumed − = 0 (at least for the KP non-MDS codes that satisfy − = ). Correcting for this looseness would result in a match with the symbiotic attack.
Generic Collision Attack against MDS Constructions
If we want to run Algorithm 3 (with fixed = − and = /(3 − ) as obtained in Corollary 1) we ideally want a time complexity almost coinciding with the targeted query complexity. For = − it holds that ℐ =Ĩ, obviating the need for the steps Filtering and Degrees of Freedom. We have already seen that Local Collision Detection costs at most a small logarithmic factor, which leaves only the Merge Phase and Collision Pruning to worry about. Together, these two steps are designed to produce ℐ . A naive approach would enumerate all elements in the much larger˜ ℐ , which is wasteful. Our task is therefore, given the lists of partial collisions for ∈ ℐ, to create ℐ more efficiently.
In the sequel, we will follow in the footsteps ofÖzen, Shrimpton, and Stam who used the dual code in a similar problem related to their preimage-finding attack. An important innovation for the collision-finding attack stems from the realization that can be regarded as belonging to the (quasi) shortened code. This allows the use of the dual of the shortened code to speed up the search. As the minimum distance of the dual code is an important parameter in determining the overall time-complexity and shortening a code reduces the minimum distance of its dual accordingly, we make a significant efficiency gain this way.
Road map. We present our collision attack against Knudsen-Prennel compression functions whose pre is based on MDS codes in Alg. 4, whereas its analysis is given in Thm. 4. We leave the generalization of our attack to (KP-suggested) non-MDS parameters together with the proof of Thm. 4 to the full version of this work where we also investigate a more space efficient version of Alg. 4.
Reducing the Time Complexity. Since ℐ =Ĩ and = − , we know from Algorithm 3 that it is enough to find a nonzero ∈ ℑ( pre ) of the form = ′ + 0 for ′ = ∑ ∈Ĩ to complete the collision. Now notice that ′ is lying in a smaller space ℑ( ′ pre ) identified by ′ that is the [ − , − , ′ ] shortened code obtained from (by dropping the zeroes of the codewords from all the positions appearing in ℐ 0 ). This observation allows us to guarantee that ∈ ℑ( pre ) once we determine that a candidate ′ is in ℑ( ′ pre ). Hence, it is enough for our purposes to limit ourselves to ℑ( ′ pre ) rather than looking for membership in the larger space ℑ( pre ). To this end, we first identify an index set ℐ ℎ ′ ⊆ {1, . . . , } (the role of ℎ ′ will be explained momentarily) defining a subspace ⊕ Output: A colliding pair ( , ′ ) ∈ ( {0, 1} ′ ) 2 such that ( ) = ( ′ ), ∕ = ′ , and if = pre ( ) and ′ = pre ( ′ ) then for all ∈ ℐ0 it holds that = ′ .
1. Initialization. Set ℐ ← {1, . . . , }∖ℐ0 (with |ℐ| = ), ℐ =Ĩ, and set ← /(3 − ). Obtain ′ consisting of codewords ′ ∈ ′ that are constructed from ∈ by dropping zeroes of from all the positions appearing in ℐ0. 
both sorted on their fourth component. when restricted to this subspace, is not surjective. As a consequence, we will be able to prune significantly the total collection of candidate ′ s keeping only those that are possibly in ℑ( ′ pre ) (restricted to ⊕ ∈ℐ ℎ ′ ). In the sequel, we will show how to efficiently find an index set ℐ ℎ ′ , and how to efficiently prune.
An important parameter determining the runtime of our collision attack is ′ ⊥ , the minimum distance of the dual shortened code. Let be the function that maps ℎ improved collision attacks namely the revised Watanabe, symbiotic collision and parametrized collision attacks. Our new attacks work with the least number of queries reported so far. Moreover, except for only one out of 16 suggested parameters, these attacks beat the time-complexity of any prior attack we are aware of.
